At the Office of Strategic Services
In 1942, Dulles became Bern, Switzerland station chief of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Dulles’ experience with the OSS intensified his approval of covert action in American foreign policymaking. [1] There, Dulles learned that the United States’ could use democratic and clandestine operations at the same time to oppose regimes that threatened the United States. [2]
The National Security Act of 1947 Testimony
When the National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency, Dulles testified before Congress’ House Committee on Expenditures. Among other things, Dulles argued for Congress to enact vague definitions of the nature and function of the CIA:
“I would prefer to see the Congress, not in too much detail, however, define the nature and functions of the Central Intelligence Agency, ” said Dulles. [5] His statements indicate his pragmatism; vague definitions of the nature and function of the CIA made covert operations easier to pursue. Screen grabs from U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments: Hearing Before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 18th Cong., 1st sess., 1947.
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1954 U.S News and World Report Interview
In 1954, Dulles conducted an interview entitled “We Tell Russia Too Much” with U.S World and News Report. Dulles argued: “in the first place, they have far greater facilities for operating in the United States than we have behind the Iron Curtain. Also, we Americans publish a great deal in our scientific and technical journals and in congressional hearings. And, of course, in our free system of government, what we do in the field of legislation for national defense is open to the public. I would give a good deal if I could know as much about the Soviet Union as the Soviet Union can learn about us by merely reading the press. Sometimes I think we go too far in what the government gives out officially and what is published in the scientific and technical field. We tell Russia too much. Under our system it’s hard to control it.” [6] Like many top policymakers in Washington at the time, Allen Dulles believed the containment of a Communist threat required covert and clandestine action; under Dulles, the Central Intelligence Agency sought to win the Cold War by supporting regimes that aligned with the United States and overthrowing ones that threatened the West’s Cold War interests. |
1954 National War College Speech
In a 1954 speech to the National War College, Dulles emphasized the
shortcomings of simplistic interpretations of communism and Soviet
aggression. “When we come to deal with the question of Soviet policy,or
the policy, for that matter, of any country in the world, I think we make a
great mistake if we assume there is any clear-cut blueprint...I believe that
the Soviet leaders improvise in many phases of their policy as events
unroll just as we have to do, and have their uncalculated revers as we
do,” said Dulles. [7]
Final Thoughts
Dulles’ view of clandestine activity is best represented in an undated CIA draft policy report from the period, which stated: “Covert action alone can never substitute for positive foreign policy, but covert action can support and further this country's avowed goals.” [8] |
Work Cited.
[1] David Talbot, The Devils Chessboard, (New York: HarperCollins, 2015), 16.
[2] Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 44.
[3] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments: Hearing Before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 18th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, 22.
[4] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments: Hearing Before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 18th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, 22.
[5] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments: Hearing Before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 18th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, 25.
[6] Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 101-102.
[7] Bevan Sewell, “The Pragmatic Face of the Covert Idealist: The Role of Allen Dulles in US Policy Discussions on Latin America, 1953 -61,” Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 2-3, (2011): 271.
[8] U.S Central Intelligence Agency: Draft Book on Communist Subversion Discussion and Outline (No date), 13, Mudd Manuscript, Libraryhttps://webspace.princeton.edu/users/mudd/digitalObjects/MC019.09/ML.2007.004/online/Reports_English_1943-1977_and_undated/19000101_0000481340.pdf
[1] David Talbot, The Devils Chessboard, (New York: HarperCollins, 2015), 16.
[2] Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 44.
[3] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments: Hearing Before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 18th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, 22.
[4] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments: Hearing Before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 18th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, 22.
[5] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments: Hearing Before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 18th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, 25.
[6] Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 101-102.
[7] Bevan Sewell, “The Pragmatic Face of the Covert Idealist: The Role of Allen Dulles in US Policy Discussions on Latin America, 1953 -61,” Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 2-3, (2011): 271.
[8] U.S Central Intelligence Agency: Draft Book on Communist Subversion Discussion and Outline (No date), 13, Mudd Manuscript, Libraryhttps://webspace.princeton.edu/users/mudd/digitalObjects/MC019.09/ML.2007.004/online/Reports_English_1943-1977_and_undated/19000101_0000481340.pdf