Guatemala and the Communist Threat
Throughout the early 1950s, Guatemala appeared vulnerable to Communist threat. The 1950 Guatemalan election of Jacobo Arbenz made the American intelligence community increasingly wary of Communism in Guatemala. After his election, Arbenz enacted many socialist reforms, including a land reform policy and the legalization of the Guatemalan Communist Party. On March 12, 1953, Guatemala was the only country in the Western Hemisphere to honor the death of Joseph Stalin, deeply alarming U.S officials.[1] The spread of communism into the Western Hemisphere became increasingly likely to U.S intelligence. [2]
Allen Dulles' Perspective
In a February 1953 National Security Council Meeting, Dulles indicated the importance of pursuing gradual concessions against Guatemala due to the “multi-faceted, sobering and complex” situation in the region. [3] Although Dulles’ intelligence gathering confirmed that communist action in Guatemala existed, other factors contributed to the volatile nature of the region; “the four major trending South and Central America were trends in the direction of economic nationalism, regionalism, and neutralism, and increasing communist influence,” said Dulles in the meeting. [4] Dulles’ statements reflect his ability to see past the rigid black and white worldview that many foreign policymakers in Washington obtained; Dulles instead understood the complex nature and motivations behind international affairs.
The American leaders behind the Guatemalan coup: Allen Dulles (left), President Dwight D. Eisenhower (center), and Allen Dulles' brother and U.S Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (right.
Operation PBSUCCESS Begins
In May of 1954, U.S intelligence learned that Arbenz purchased military equipment from Czechoslovakia. Dulles reported, “the discovery of concealed arms shipments…alerted us to the fact that massive Soviet support was being given to strengthen the position of a Communist regime in that country.” [5] Eisenhower subsequently “sought to reverse the situation by any means feasible” and Dulles became the executive agent of the clandestine action against Guatemala, later named Operation PBSUCCESS. [6]
Operation PBSCUCESS utilized both covert and overt diplomacy, highlighting Dulles’ belief that covert action could support overt American diplomacy. [7]
Operation PBSCUCESS utilized both covert and overt diplomacy, highlighting Dulles’ belief that covert action could support overt American diplomacy. [7]
Dulles' Pragmatism
Dulles’ work on PBSUCESS also reflected his pragmatic support of covert action. Economically, the United States obtained benefits pursuing action against Guatemala. Arbenz’s land reforms particularly hurt American foreign investments. The American owned United Fruit Company alone lost 234,00 acres of land in Arbenz’s land reforms. [8] Dulles recognized that Arbenz’s nationalist actions threatened American foreign investment and therefore, threatened American national interests.
Images of the American-owned United Fruit Company in Guatemala throughout the early 20th century; United Fruit profited off the tropical fruit trade, growing fruit on plantations throughout Latin America and selling to the western countries.
Operation PBSUCCESS Ends
On June 15th, 1954 the operation to unseat the Jacobo Arbenz officially embarked when 480 CIA trained rebel troops invaded Guatemala. Although the coup nearly failed, Jacobo Árbenz resigned as president of Guatemala On June 27, 1954. Dulles hailed the events as a “triumph of democracy over Soviet communism.” [9]
Works Cited.
[1] Grose Smith, Gentlemen Spy, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995), 368.
[2] Nick Cullather, The CIA’s Classified Account of Its operations in Guatemala 1952-1954, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 35.
[3] Bevan Sewell, “The Pragmatic Face of the Covert Idealist: The Role of Allen Dulles in US Policy Discussions on Latin America, 1953 -61,” Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 2-3, (2011): 277.
[4] Bevan Sewell, “The Pragmatic Face of the Covert Idealist: The Role of Allen Dulles in US Policy Discussions on Latin America, 1953 -61,” Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 2-3, (2011): 277.
[5] Laura Moye, "The United States intervention in Guatemala," International Social Science Review 73, no. 1 (1998), 48.
[6] Richard Immerman, “Guatemala as Cold War History,” Political Science Quarterly 95, no. 4, (1980): 638; John Prados, The Presidents’ Secret Wars, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Publishers, 1996), 99.
[7] Nick Cullather, The CIA’s Classified Account of Its operations in Guatemala 1952-1954, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 30.
[8] Laura Moye, "The United States intervention in Guatemala," International Social Science Review 73, no. 1 (1998), 45.
[9] John W. Young, “Great Britain's Latin American Dilemma: The Foreign Office and the Overthrow of 'Communist' Guatemala, June 1954,” The International History Review 8, no.4 (1988):588.
[1] Grose Smith, Gentlemen Spy, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995), 368.
[2] Nick Cullather, The CIA’s Classified Account of Its operations in Guatemala 1952-1954, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 35.
[3] Bevan Sewell, “The Pragmatic Face of the Covert Idealist: The Role of Allen Dulles in US Policy Discussions on Latin America, 1953 -61,” Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 2-3, (2011): 277.
[4] Bevan Sewell, “The Pragmatic Face of the Covert Idealist: The Role of Allen Dulles in US Policy Discussions on Latin America, 1953 -61,” Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 2-3, (2011): 277.
[5] Laura Moye, "The United States intervention in Guatemala," International Social Science Review 73, no. 1 (1998), 48.
[6] Richard Immerman, “Guatemala as Cold War History,” Political Science Quarterly 95, no. 4, (1980): 638; John Prados, The Presidents’ Secret Wars, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Publishers, 1996), 99.
[7] Nick Cullather, The CIA’s Classified Account of Its operations in Guatemala 1952-1954, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 30.
[8] Laura Moye, "The United States intervention in Guatemala," International Social Science Review 73, no. 1 (1998), 45.
[9] John W. Young, “Great Britain's Latin American Dilemma: The Foreign Office and the Overthrow of 'Communist' Guatemala, June 1954,” The International History Review 8, no.4 (1988):588.